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Global Health: A Public Good
without a Collective-Choice
Rule
Global health is a public good and ill-
health in one part of the globe has
consequences elsewhere: witness recent
emerging infectious diseases. It follows that
by contributing to global health, donor
countries can benefit substantially: directly,
in the form of a reduction in communicable
disease emergence and transmission [1–3],
and indirectly, through macroeconomic in-
teractions, trade, travel, migration, reduced
threats to food security, environmental deg-
radation, and unsustainable consumption
patterns [4]. For instance, reports indicate
that incorporating global health into US
foreign policy has enhanced American na-
tional security and prosperity [5].
Despite the substantial benefits that
could be derived from global health and
the existence of highly cost-effective global
health interventions—e.g., childhood im-
munisation programmes involving second
opportunity measles vaccination or malar-
ia control through high coverage artemi-
sinin combination treatments [6–10]—
global health continues to be underfunded.
That most low-income countries have
achieved insufficient or no progress to-
wards meeting the health Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) by the 2015
target [11] indicates the current level of
funding is likely insufficient. An estimated
additional US$36 to US$45 billion annu-
ally by 2015 is said to be required to meet
the health MDGs [11]. This situation is
exacerbated by the ongoing global finan-
cial crisis that is leading to a slowdown in
the growth of bilateral donations [12].
The absence of a mechanism to en-
courage—or enforce—any expected con-
tributions from each country has, there-
fore, led to the tragedy of the commons,
defined as the depletion of shared resourc-
es when users act in a self-interested and
independent manner [13], which in this
context leads to global health being
underfunded because the benefits of con-
tributing to global health are shared with
other countries, including those who
refrain from donating.
Global health, represented herein as
meeting the health MDGs, falls into a
category of large-scale global commons
such as climate change mitigation. For
global commons to be effectively managed
requires a unanimous agreement or treaty
for a collective-choice rule, such as the
Kyoto Protocol (Box 1) [14]. However, for
global health, a collective-choice rule to
establish the expected contributions from
each country is currently lacking.
Parallels with Tradable Carbon
Permits: Global Health Permits?
Humanity faces new challenges to
manage global commons and only one
planet to experiment with, so it is
important to draw lessons from other
successful strategies on global commons
management [14]. Market-based systems
of tradable carbon emission permits have
become one of the bases of the Kyoto
agreement on climate change (Box 1).
Tradable permits are economically very
efficient, making them advantageous
compared to command and control mea-
sures (Box 1; Figure 1) [15]. A market is
completed by a cap-and-trade mechanism:
carbon emissions of countries are capped
and as a result countries need to buy
permits that compensate for their emis-
sions in excess of the cap (Figure 1).
In the case of carbon emission permits,
the metric is tonnes of carbon emissions
avoided. In our case of global health, a
suitable metric is disability-adjusted life
years (DALYs) potentially averted [16,17].
In the Kyoto protocol, the cap rule is
based on a global emission target and a
consensus of how to apportion responsi-
bility to individual countries, in our case,
raising the necessary funds to meet the
health MDGs and a rule to share the effort
to achieve this reduction. There are many
possible ways to set expected contributions
from cap-and-trade rules. The method we
use here is to link global health aid
donations with domestic health investment
using the perspective of a hypothetical
global social planner aiming to reduce
global disease burden: the greater the
investment on low cost-effectiveness inter-
ventions in high- and middle-income
countries, the more inefficient the alloca-
tion of resources to reduce global disease
burden. The system then encourages
compensation for the resulting inefficiency
by requiring the support of highly cost-
effective projects in low-income countries.
The Policy Forum allows health policy makers
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Other cap-and-trade frameworks could be
adopted and this particular proposal is not
necessary for the overall scheme to succeed.
In our proposal, the cap is based on the
cost-effectiveness of a health intervention
that can be used to identify inefficient levels
of health expenditure [18]. A general cost-
effectiveness criterion suggested by the
Commission on Macroeconomics and
Health of the World Health Organization
(WHO) [19] recommends that interven-
tions be cost-effective if their cost per
avoided DALY in a specified setting is
lower than thrice the per capita gross
national income (GNI).
To define the cap rule of a tradable
DALY credit system, we propose a global
health cost-effectiveness threshold (GHCET)
under which health interventions are
deemed cost-effective, this being three times
the GNI threshold classifying countries as
low-income. A global DALY tradable permit
market would be established, in which high-
and middle-income nations who wish to
implement an intervention that is cost-
effective domestically, but does not meet
the GHCET, can purchase averted DALYs
from highly cost-effective health interven-
tions in low-income countries (Figure 1 and
Box 2 for examples of the system at the
project level and Text S1 for details).
Although implementing the trade in
averted DALYs would be feasible if cost-
effectiveness analyses were universally
available for projects in high-, middle-,
and low-income countries, at present the
cost-effectiveness of many interventions is
not known, preventing a global estimation
of the volumes that would need to be
traded without substantial additional in-
frastructure. To estimate, in the interim,
expected contributions globally, we use a
national-level indicator of the difference
between the hypothetical DALYs averted
domestically and those that could be
averted in a low-income setting based on
the GNI and health expenditure of each
country (see Text S1).
Expected Contributions
Under this proposal, in accordance with
their GNI and health expenditure, the
greatest defaulting countries per capita
to meet the health MDGs were the US
(US$22–US$33) and several affluent Euro-
pean countries (e.g., Switzerland, US$23–
US$31; Austria, US$21–US$27; and Ger-
many, US$18–US$24 [Figure 2; estimates for
all countries can be found in Text S1, Tables
S1 and S2]). Only a few countries currently
contribute more outlay to global health per
capita than would be expected from the
DALY credit system (Text S1, Tables S1 and
S2): Ireland, the UK, Denmark, the United
Arab Emirates, Luxembourg, and Norway.
Under the proposed DALY credit
system, to bridge the funding gap between
current contributions and the contribu-
tions needed to meet the health MDGs,
high-income countries would account for
74%–77% of the remaining US$36–
US$45 billion in investment required to
meet the health MDGs, the rest coming
from middle-income countries. 19%–28%
of the total increase, or US$6.8–US$10
billion, would come from the US, 5%–6%
from Japan, 4%–6% from Germany, 3%–
4% from France (Figure 2 and Text S1,
Tables S1 and S2), while some of the
bigger middle-income countries would also
contribute substantially, with 6%–7% from
Summary Points
N Mechanisms to establish the expected financial contribution from each country
to achieve the health Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) could encourage
scaling-up of contributions.
N Mirroring global carbon permit markets to mitigate climate change, we propose
a cap-and-trade system consisting of a global cost-effectiveness criterion and a
disability-adjusted life year (DALY) global credit market.
N Under this system, high-income and middle-income countries should contrib-
ute, respectively, 74% and 26% of the additional US$36–US$45 billion annually
needed to attain the health MDGs. The change relative to current contributions
would vary, with some countries needing to scale-up substantially their
expected annual contributions under the proposed market (e.g., US, US$7–
US$10 billion; China, US$2–US$3 billion; Japan, US$2 billion; Germany, US$1.5–
US$2 billion), while a few already meet or exceed their required contributions
(i.e., Norway, the United Arab Emirates, Luxembourg, and the UK).
N A DALY tradable credit market offers the potential to increase the efficiency of
global health investments while promoting international obligations to the
pursuit of an agreed global common good.
Box 1. Cap-and-Trade Measures for Climate Change Mitigation
Origins: Attaining global support for a treaty to tackle climate change was a slow
process. Awareness of the threat of climate change and the idea of limiting
warming started in the 1970s through a series of scientific and economic reports
[27]. Early political developments started in a few countries in the 1980s with
reports focusing on the creation of emissions targets. Wide support in
preparation for Kyoto was finally obtained in the Second World Climate
Conference in Geneva in 1990 [27].
Design: The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in the third session of the Conference
of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in
1997. It sets legally binding limits on greenhouse gas emissions on signatories.
The protocol introduced flexible mechanisms such as Emissions Trading and the
Clean Development Mechanism—project-based emissions reductions based for
instance in renewable energies in low-income countries. The efficiency generated
by having a market of carbon emissions permits stems from the idea that
emission abatement costs are much lower in low-income countries (this
represents a clear analogy with policies aimed at global disease burden
reductions), i.e., it is cheaper for high-income countries to support carbon
sequestration projects in low-income countries than to invest in relatively more
expensive measures to cut emissions domestically, thereby reducing the
economic impact of emissions reduction.
Outcomes: The market size of carbon emissions grew from US$11 billion in 2005
to US$140 billion in 2009 where it stalled, influenced by the global financial crisis
[28]. The volume of carbon traded in 2008 was 4.8 Gigatonnes (Gt) of CO2e [28],
where half of the trade corresponded to actual emissions reductions [29].
Although these outcomes indicate the potential of the cap-and-trade mecha-
nisms, the volume of carbon emissions reductions is still far from the 50 GtCO2e/
year needed to stabilize the concentration of CO2e at 550 ppm by 2050 [29].
Challenges include proving the integrity of carbon credits and the excessive
allocation of allowances for carbon emissions to some middle-income countries.
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China (i.e., US$2.1–US$2.7 billion), 3% from
Brazil, and 2% from India (Figure 2 and Text
S1, Tables S1 and S2). Our proposal,
therefore, involves a marked change in per-
spective over who should contribute to
meeting the health MDGs, with contribu-
tions expected from large emerging econo-
mies such as China and Brazil.
Our estimates of necessary increases in
health aid are dwarfed if compared with the
annual military budgets of many of the
countries involved. For instance, the US’s
global health contributions should increase
an equivalent to 1% of its military budget,
for Japan and Germany 3%, Brazil 4%, and
the increase would be 2% of their military
budgets for France, China, and India [20].
We have already noted the security benefits
of investing in global health [5].
Increased Efficiency and
Effectiveness in Global Health
Allocations
Our proposal is that countries be
expected to contribute a number of DALY
permits. Differently priced permits would
create an incentive for nations to invest
permits on the most cost-effective pro-
jects—to reduce their financial outlay—
enhancing the efficiency of global health
allocations (Box 2). This allocation strategy
generates a new, more efficient, ranking of
allocation priorities very different to cur-
rent allocations (for an analogous re-
ranking process see [21]), which is relevant
because the lack of success in achieving the
health MDGs is not only caused by
insufficiency of funding but also by
inefficiency in funding allocation that does
not necessarily prioritize the most needy
recipients [22,23].
Scaling-up of contributions and efficien-
cy in their allocation would not, however,
mean that global health implementation
and efficacy problems such as the tempo-
rary nature of financing, lack of delivery
coordination [22], fragmentation, or di-
vergence from national policies [23] would
be solved. Nonetheless, the system pro-
vides for an opportunity to mitigate these
problems. For instance, if a centralised
DALY market were to be established,
donations could be globally coordinated.
As a result, transaction costs could be
minimized and interventions could match
recipient needs better.
Policy Implementation and
Challenges
Establishing International Support
The system requires countries to relin-
quish some sovereignty over global health,
and the experience of Kyoto suggests the
steps involved in achieving this (see Box 1).
First, the system would need to attract
the attention of a nucleus of countries,
probably those already investing substan-
tial sums on global health. Then, a request
by those countries to consider a proposal
based on the system would be initiated in a
Kyoto-style Conference of the Parties. If
an agreement is reached and a legally
binding document proposed, countries
could opt to sign it. Such agreement would
need to provide consensus inter alia over
the regulating body, the GHCET (or
Figure 1. Conceptual comparison of carbon credit markets for the mitigation of climate change and the proposed DALY credit
market to meet the health MDGs. OBJ, objective.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001392.g001
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alternative cap-and-trade rules) and mech-
anisms to validate DALY credits.
There is undoubtedly a risk that coun-
tries could opt to free ride the system by not
signing the agreement. However, the pro-
posal would function if a group of altruistic
countries willing to contribute proactively
towards meeting the health MDGs and
countries willing to initiate cooperation
hoping that it will be returned [14] would
start trading DALY permits, thus exerting
peer pressure on other countries. If the
system is legally established, this group of
countries might grow further with those
unwilling to cooperate unless legally assured
[14]. Experience from carbon permits
suggests success is possible even without full
participation: even though the US, Afgha-
nistan, Andorra, and South Sudan are not
signatories of the Kyoto protocol, a major-
ity of countries are already participating in
fully functioning emissions permit markets.
Indeed, cap-and-trade systems for climate
change mitigation have shown the potential
for the market to grow rapidly (from US$11
to US$140 billion from 2005 to 2011; Box
1). Given the lower volumes required to
meet the health MDGs (US$36–US$45
billion increase); scaling-up of global health
donations might be a feasible goal.
Management and Monitoring
The system could be overseen by an
international organization where propos-
als of cost-effective interventions could be
submitted for evaluation. Approved pro-
jects would be allocated DALY credits,
which would be available for purchase by
donor countries, NGOs, and philanthrop-
ic organizations. The WHO would be a
natural choice as overseer and while it
would likely be supported by proponents
that, in a globalised world, the authority of
WHO needs to increase [24], others might
dissent. If consensus over the regulating
body is not reached, the system could
initially be implemented on a regional
basis or through voluntary schemes. A
decentralized approach in which individ-
ual health projects can purchase DALY
credits to conform to GHCET (Box 2), on
the other hand, would not present as many
challenges. Using the current global health
architecture, decentralized markets would
allow flexibility for global health donors—
either at national or project level—to
purchase credits from projects of their
choice. This approach would, however,
require comprehensive cost-effectiveness
analyses of projects in different regions to
certify their validity as DALYs credits. The
WHO-CHOICE project [25] and the
Disease Control Priorities Project [26]
have covered numerous diseases and
regions and would be a solid starting
point. Expanding the certification of cost-
effectiveness of new projects could, how-
ever, impose additional transaction costs.
Challenges
We have proposed tying global health
contributions to national health expendi-
ture via a GHCET. The justification for
this is in terms of a hypothetical global
planner aiming to prevent the tragedy of
the commons in global health by request-
ing compensation for inefficient domestic
allocations. Invoking a global social plan-
ner is necessary given a fundamental
difference with carbon markets: carbon
emissions create direct impacts worldwide
but domestic health investment does not.
Other cap-and-trade frameworks could be
adopted and may receive more support.
The GHCET system can be argued
against for (i) penalising high expenditure
in health and thus creating a disincentive
on domestic health investment. This
disincentive would likely be small (e.g., a
Box 2. Examples of DALY Credit Transactions at the Project
Level
Under the proposed system, the DALY credits that need to be purchased per
intervention or project (Ncredits) are:
Ncredits~
Cproject
3:GNILI
{
Cproject
CEproject
 
,
where Cproject is the cost of the health intervention, GNILI the per capita gross
national income threshold by which a country is categorized as low-income, and
CEproject the cost-effectiveness of the health intervention. At 2009 dollars,
3?GNILI=US$3,015.
Examples of projects that might require offsetting by DALY credits:
1. Pneumococcal conjugate vaccination in Australia. Cost-effectiveness is
US$100,853 per DALY averted (CEproject), total costs are US$5 million annually
[30,31]. 1,332 DALY credits annually would be required.
2. Obesity reduction through physician counseling in China and Brazil.
Cost-effectiveness amounts are US$10,300 and US$9,300 per DALY averted, total
costs are US$7.4 and US$3.8 million over 20 years [32]. 1,522–751 DALY credits
would be required, respectively.
3. Taxes to reduce tobacco consumption in Western Europe. Cost-
effectiveness is US$51 per DALY averted [28]. Because CEproject,3?GNILI no
DALY credits are required.
4. Tuberculosis control in the US. Cost-effectiveness is US$15 per DALY
averted [28]. No DALY credits are required.
Examples of projects that might be offered to the market:
A. Increase in the coverage of the traditional Expanded Program on
Immunization in South Asia. Cost-effectiveness is US$10 per DALY averted
[29]. The price of each DALY would be US$10.
B. Second opportunity measles vaccination in sub-Saharan Africa. Cost-
effectiveness is US$5 per DALY averted [29]. The price of each DALY would be
US$5.
Examples of transactions to conform to GHCET:
– Project 1 buys credits annually from project A at US$10,654 (increase of 0.21% of
the project costs).
– Project 2 buys credits from project B at US$7,600 and US$3,700 in China and
Brazil respectively (increase in project costs of 0.1%).
Alternative sources of DALY credits could be multilateral donor agencies (e.g.,
GAVI, Global Fund, UNITAID) that represent innovative financing mechanisms and
improve systems for resource mobilization, pooling, channeling, resource
allocation and implementation [33].
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ratio of health expenditure to expected
contributions of 1 to 0.0045 occurs for the
US); (ii) using a cost-effectiveness criterion
that was initially intended only for low-
income countries. We favoured its use for
all countries because of its simplicity and
transparency, despite the relationship be-
tween health investment, GNI and health
being complex; and (iii) the specific value
of the GHCET, which we based on the
threshold of low-income countries. Our
results would change if that threshold were
changed for instance to include middle-
income countries (see sensitivity analysis in
Text S1). Alternatives to the GHCET
would be to base expected DALY contri-
butions on other metrics of ability to pay
(e.g., GDP) and need (e.g., poverty or
mortality rates) or by attempting to
quantify the positive externalities countries
would gain and generate from global and
domestic health funding and link DALY
contributions to that. However, the esti-
mation of those externalities would be
challenging. In addition, data on health
donations per country are incomplete
because countries also contribute to global
health indirectly, for instance through tax
exemptions for private foundations, and
these contribution channels are not readily
quantifiable. Prior to the implementation
of the system the cap-and-trade rules and
formulas determining contributions should
be subject of political debate.
The establishment of cooperation would
not be immune to global economic crises
leading to reductions of global health
contributions [12], and indeed the system
would be especially vulnerable to econom-
ic crises during its implementation period.
It is notable, though, that during the
current economic crisis only one country
(Canada) has withdrawn from its commit-
ments to the Kyoto protocol. A legally
binding commitment, and an efficient and
transparent market, may be the best
protection from the fickleness of global
health donations.
Conclusions
In both theory and practice, we believe
experiences from carbon permit markets
are encouraging. They efficiently raise
resources to help manage global commons,
in this case climate change. If imple-
mented, an analogous tradable DALY
Figure 2. Total and per capita annual expected contributions to meet the health MDGs (‘‘Target’’), compared to the current level of
donations (‘‘Current’’) in 25 selected countries. *Norway has an excess of contributions of US$70 per capita, and the US a level of donations of
US$6.7 billion and a shortfall of expected contributions of US$6.8 billion; both are off the scale.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001392.g002
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credits market would incentivise countries
to scale-up their global health commit-
ments to meet the health MDGs and, we
expect, any post-MDG targets such as the
proposed Rio +20 Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals. If the health MDGs are to be
realised, collectively we should be ready to
implement the most powerful strategies to
manage global commons. A DALY trad-
able credit market offers the potential to
increase the efficiency of global health
investments while, at the same time,
promoting international obligations to the
pursuit of an agreed global common good.
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